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Abstract
If women have diﬀerent economic preferences than men, then female economic
and political empowerment is likely to change policy and household decisions, and
in turn macroeconomic outcomes. We test the hypothesis that female enfranchise-
ment leads to lower government budget deﬁcits due gender diﬀerences in preferences
over ﬁscal outcomes. Estimating the impact of women’s vote on budget deﬁcits
in a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences regression for Swiss cantonal panel data, we ﬁnd that
including women in the electorate reduces average per capita budget deﬁcits by a
statistically signiﬁcant amount.
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11 Introduction
Most would agree that at some level the average woman is diﬀerent from the average man.
What is less clear is whether gender diﬀerences can also be found in economic behavior,
which in turn would aﬀect economic outcomes at the macro level where diﬀerences among
individuals are averaged out. A small but quickly growing empirical literature looks at how
the increasing political and economic inﬂuence of women may have contributed to changes
in economic outcomes in recent years. Using microeconomic data, Duﬂo and Udry (2004)
and Pitt and Khandker (1998) investigate the impact of the relative inﬂuence of women
on intra-household resource allocation, and ﬁnd signiﬁcant gender eﬀects. In particular,
women prefer to spend relatively more on the human capital on their children (food, clothes
and education). Chattopadhyay and Duﬂo (2004) ﬁnd that women’s political inﬂuence
in village councils in India matters substantially for the types of public goods provided.
Moreover, research on the microﬁnance movement of the last decades has shown that with
surprising regularity across cultures, women have superior repayment rates compared to
those of men (United Nations Capital Development Fund, 2002; Kevane and Wydick, 2001;
Wydick, 2002).
Much less research has addressed the question of whether female empowerment has
aﬀected macroeconomic outcomes1. A number of studies look at the eﬀect of women’s
political inﬂuence on government spending in industrialized countries. This literature
argues that women care more about social issues and hence have a relatively stronger
1See Stotsky (2006) for a recent survey.
2preference for social expenditures than men. Therefore, as women gain increasing political
power, we should see the size of the state (and social expenditures in particular) increase2.
The empirical evidence suggests consistently that female enfranchisement is associated with
a change in the composition of public spending, while it is less conclusive on the eﬀect on
the size of the state (Abrams and Settle, 1999; Aidt et al, 2006; Lott and Kenny, 1999;
Stutzer and Kienast, 2005; Funk and Gathmann, 2006). Another contribution is Seguino
and Floro (2003), who look at the impact of women’s relative bargaining power within
households, as measured by the relative income of women, on aggregate savings in semi-
industrial countries. They ﬁnd support for the hypothesis that female decision making
power on the household level leads to higher savings. But this is as far as the literature
has come.
This paper contributes to the literature by asking whether women might prefer a dif-
ferent public savings level than men. If this is the case, then granting the right to vote to
women may change the course of government budget deﬁcits and debts, and may therefore
ultimately aﬀect the sustainability of public ﬁnances.
We focus on the impact of women’s political inﬂuence on public savings for a number
of reasons. First, the question has not previously been asked. Women’s political inﬂu-
ence and the use of deﬁcit ﬁnancing of public expenditures rose explosively in industrial
countries in the post WWII era, making it interesting to know whether women’s enfran-
chisement might have mitigated, or on the contrary added to recent public debt buildups.
The second reason is related to data availability. We use a panel data set for Swiss cantons
2Metzler and Richards (1981) provide the theoretical underpinnings for this hypothesis.
3to test our hypothesis, which has abundant data on government budgets while data on
aggregate cantonal savings and many other macroeconomic variables are scarce. Third,
we measure women’s political inﬂuence by whether or not women have the right to vote,
which, we argue in the following, can be considered a fairly exogenous measure of politi-
cal inﬂuence compared to other measures used in the literature. Female suﬀrage proxies
women’s political inﬂuence on ﬁscal outcomes relatively well, while women’s inﬂuence on
other macroeconomic outcomes (such as household savings or investment decisions) is more
complex and would hence be less well captured by female suﬀrage alone.
The way in which cantonal female suﬀrage was introduced in Switzerland provides con-
ditions akin to a social experiment. Female enfranchisement was introduced in diﬀerent
years across cantons, and relatively recently (women were ﬁrst given the right to vote in
Neuchˆ atel and Vaud in 1959, and the last canton to grant women the vote was Appenzell
I. Rh. in 1990 - all other 23 cantons introduced women’s suﬀrage between these dates),
allowing for a substantial amount of variation both in the time and in the cross-section
dimensions. An additional advantage of this data set is that by studying the sub-federal
level rather than national governments, and by using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator,
we reduce possible unmeasurable diﬀerences in political institutions and economic charac-
teristics across the cross-sectional units, which might otherwise bias the results.
The results of our empirical investigation are clear and robust, implying that women’s
political inﬂuence does have an eﬀect on ﬁscal outcomes: Women’s right to vote has a
statistically signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on cantonal government budget deﬁcits.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the determinants of
4budget deﬁcits and how gender diﬀerences could possibly aﬀect these. We conclude on
a-priori grounds that the gender diﬀerences that are most likely to aﬀect preferences for
budget deﬁcits should be sought among potential gender diﬀerences in time discounting, life
expectancy, altruism, risk perception and prudence, rather than among gender diﬀerences
in economic constraints (e.g. income, labor market participation). Section 3 discusses the
estimation methodology, while section 4 deals with our data. Section 5 takes our question
to the data for Swiss cantons for the period 1955 to 1999. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2 Gender diﬀerences and preferences for budget deﬁcits
Introducing female suﬀrage changes the preferences and constraints of the median voter
if women have diﬀerent policy preferences and are subject to diﬀerent economic circum-
stances than men. Following standard median voter reasoning (Hotelling, 1929; Metzler
and Richards, 1981), the franchise should hence matter for the government budget deﬁcit if
there are gender diﬀerences in preferences over the intertemporal allocation of spending on
public goods and the intertemporal incidence of taxation. Focusing on the budget deﬁcit
rather than on the size of government allows us to abstract from all the reasons why women
might want more or less public goods and transfers in general (see Funk and Gathmann,
2006), and only focus on whether one should want such public goods or transfers to be paid
for today through higher taxes or tomorrow through a higher public debt, given the size of
the state. There is for example no reason why having stronger preferences for social spend-
ing should translate into stronger preferences for running budget deﬁcits, while how you
value spending today relative to spending tomorrow is crucial for this decision. To evaluate
5whether gender diﬀerences might aﬀect preferences for budget deﬁcits, we consider how the
two genders’ preferences for budget deﬁcits might diﬀer according to prevailing theories of
budget deﬁcits, taking into account the results of the literature on gender diﬀerences in
preferences and relevant gender diﬀerences in economic circumstances.
The theoretical literature on budget deﬁcits suggests four diﬀerent categories of mo-
tives for running unbalanced government budgets: Normative ﬁscal policy motives; po-
litical economy motives (the deﬁcit bias); inter-generational redistribution motives; and
consumption smoothing/precautionary savings motives. The ﬁrst two categories of budget
determinants do not seem likely to be inﬂuenced by women’s enfranchisement. Normative
ﬁscal policy models such as the Barro tax smoothing model (Barro, 1979) and Keynesian
countercyclical ﬁscal policy model prescribe running deﬁcits in downturns and surpluses
in upturns, with a zero (or neutral) deﬁcit over the medium term. If women were found
to suﬀer disproportionately from economic shocks or tax incidence, then we should expect
women to want a more active countercyclical ﬁscal policy, but there is no reason to ex-
pect women to want persistently diﬀerent levels of deﬁcits than men with these theories
in mind. Similarly, political economy motives for running deﬁcits are based on the obser-
vation that deﬁcits are shaped by the institutional setup within which elected politicians
act in a democracy (time inconsistency a la Alesina and Tabellini, 1999; and common pool
problems a la von Hagen and Harden, 1995), and there are no obvious reasons why adding
female voters to the electorate should change this institutional setup.
The third category, intergenerational redistribution motives for deﬁcits, on the other
hand, is likely to be inﬂuenced by gender diﬀerences and hence the franchise. Note that
6running a deﬁcit today implies that taxpayers will have to pay for the servicing of the
associated increase in the public debt in the future. Hence, if a voter does not expect to
be paying taxes for long, he or she might deem a deﬁcit today - yielding direct beneﬁts in
terms of higher public spending given tax revenues - less costly than another voter who
expects to be around and pay taxes for longer. This means that voters with a longer time
horizon will internalize a larger fraction of the intertemporal cost of a deﬁcit today than
voters with shorter horizons. Women may therefore prefer lower deﬁcits than men simply
because women tend to live longer than men3. Moreover, if women care more about their
children’s (or other peoples’ children’s) future welfare than men, then they may care more
about the eﬀects of running up debts today on the tax burden of future generations, which
in turn could lead women to prefer lower budget deﬁcits relative to men. There is a vast
and ongoing experimental literature investigating whether women are more altruistic than
men (see Croson and Gneezy, 2004, for a recent review). Not surprisingly, the answer
depends on what is meant by altruism, but very broadly, women are in general found to
be more concerned with the welfare of others than men.
The ﬁnal category of determinants of deﬁcits, intertemporal smoothing of public con-
sumption and precautionary savings, is also potentially inﬂuenced by gender diﬀerences,
as these public savings motives are determined by the individual’s time preference and
degree of prudence toward risk4. Whereas the standard representative agent assumption
3Women on average live about six years longer than men in Switzerland.
4These motives for public savings are identical to the reasons for private agents to save - see Browning
and Lusardi (1996) for a thorough review of the literature on savings. To make the analogy to private
savings motives, Ricardian equivalence can (for example) be broken by assuming that public and private
goods are imperfect substitutes.
7underlying mainstream economics implies that there is a common rate of time preference
and degree of risk aversion and prudence for all individuals of an economy, the ﬁndings
of behavioral economics and neuroscience suggest that in fact, behavioral characteristics
such as time preference varies strongly across individuals, time, and types of situations
and decisions to be made (Frederick et al, 2002; Camerer et al, 2005). The representa-
tive agent assumption is commonly defended by stating that on average, the preference
characteristics of individuals of an economy can be taken to be approximately constant, at
least in the long term and at the macro level. But if the average rate of time preference
and degree of prudence vary systematically across gender, such a defense is no longer valid
as women gain increasing political and economic inﬂuence. Appendix B lays out a simple
median voter model which shows that the franchise leads to diﬀerent outcomes for budget
deﬁcits when women have diﬀerent preferences over ﬁscal outcomes than men.
While the literature is still not conclusive, the rate of time preference may display gen-
der diﬀerences. Viewing time preference, or patience, through the lenses of evolutionary
psychology could lead to the prediction that women have a biological5 bias toward caring
more about the future than men, in that “a sex diﬀerence in discounting is predictable.
Because men have always had some chance of gaining ﬁtness from short term expenditures
of mating eﬀort, whereas successful reproduction typically requires more prolonged parental
investment by women, men should have evolved to discount the future more steeply than
5Without getting into the debate on nature versus nurture, it is worth mentioning here that recent
research has been able to establish the existence of biological gender diﬀerences in behavior, in that
hormonal inﬂuences during pregnancy are found to play a role in determining the likelihood of certain
behavioral traits which are usually considered gender stereotypical (see Baron-Cohen, 2003). But we still
know very little about whether such biological gender diﬀerences are of any importance when viewed
relative to the strong inﬂuence of socialization of the genders.
8women” (Wilson and Daly, 2004, page S117.)6. The evidence is scarce - this is a very
diﬃcult hypothesis to test - but some survey and experimental studies of gender diﬀer-
ences in time discounting provide support for this prediction (e.g. Kirby and Marakovic,
1996; Read and Read, 2004). Other studies ﬁnd that average time discounting does not
display gender eﬀects, but that the way in which time discounting varies across types of
intertemporal choices or situations is gender speciﬁc (e.g. McLeish and Oxoby, 2005; or
the pretty woman eﬀect of Wilson and Daly, 2004). Thus, while the evidence is mixed,
there are some indications that we might expect women to prefer lower budget deﬁcits for
reasons of gender diﬀerences in time preference.
There is also some indication that women might want more precautionary public savings
than men. The experimental and survey literature on gender diﬀerences in risk aversion is
large and very active, converging on the conclusion that women in general seem to be more
risk averse than men (see Croson and Gneezy, 2004, for a recent review). But risk aversion
is only a necessary condition for individuals to wish to save for precautionary reasons. We
also need to assess whether women are more prudent in their attitudes toward risk than
men to make a ﬁrm prediction7, and this is a question which to our knowledge has not yet
been asked.
6This prediction was the only one regarding time preference that we were able to ﬁnd in the evolutionary
psychology literature, but it is of course just one story among many possible stories about the evolutionary
pressures facing humans in our Pleistocene past. An alternative story could for example be that men
should have evolved to me more patient than women because men would have to invest a lot of time in
accumulating sharper hunting skills than their male competitors in the quest to impress potential female
mates (we are grateful to Paul Seabright for making this point).
7Formally, risk aversion requires that the utility function is concave, whereas prudence is a characteristic
which is captured by a negative third derivative of the utility function. See Browning and Lusardi (1996)
for how prudence determines precautionary savings.
9To summarize, the review of the literature allows for the identiﬁcation of the most
important factors which aﬀect preferences for budget deﬁcits. These include life expectancy,
altruism, patience and prudence toward risk. On grounds of life expectancy alone, we
would expect women to prefer lower budget deﬁcits than men. Moreover, if women are
more altruistic, more patient and/or more prudent in the face of risk than men, then we
should expect women to want lower budget deﬁcits than men. Our prior is therefore that
granting women the right to vote should lead to lower budget deﬁcits, but given the mixed
evidence on gender diﬀerences in behavioral traits, the question is ultimately an empirical
one.
3 Empirical speciﬁcation
Let v be a dummy variable which takes a value of unity when women have the right to
vote, and zero otherwise. Our baseline empirical speciﬁcation then relates cantonal budget
deﬁcits to their determinants in the following linear manner:
dc,t = αc + γt + ψ1vc,t + εc,t (1)
where dc,t = bc,t/nc,t is the real budget deﬁcit per capita in canton c at time t. The
parameter ψ1 is a time-invariant regression coeﬃcient to be estimated, and αc, γt and εc,t
are, respectively, a canton ﬁxed eﬀect, a time ﬁxed eﬀect and a canton and time varying
error term.
The previous theoretical and empirical literature on budget deﬁcits proposes a list of
additional explanatory variables which are relevant for explaining deﬁcits. First, as noted
10in the previous section, Barro tax smoothing (Barro, 1979) and Keynesian countercycli-
cal ﬁscal policy prescriptions imply that budget deﬁcits should co-vary negatively with
economic conditions. We therefore control for the rate of growth of real gross cantonal
income (federal and international economic conditions will be captured through time ﬁxed
eﬀects). Election cycles (Nordhaus, 1975 and Rogoﬀ and Sibert, 1988) are controlled for by
including a current and lagged dummy variable taking the value of unity for election years,
and zero otherwise. We control for changes in the ideological orientation of cantonal par-
liaments (Hibbs, 1977; Persson and Svensson, 1989) by including the share of seats held by
left-wing political parties. Finally, we control for two speciﬁc features of the Swiss federal
ﬁscal system. Fiscal redistribution across cantons is taken into account by including the
growth rate of the real unconditional federal grants per capita that each canton receives,
and the presence of ﬁscal rules (Feld and Kirchg¨ assner, 2005) is controlled for by including
a dummy variable that takes a value of unity when ﬁscal rules exist in a given canton at a
given time period.
4 Data
The sample covers twenty-ﬁve cantons over the period 1954 to 1999. All quantitative
variables included in the regressions are measured in constant 1993 prices (deﬂated with
the consumer price index). Sources and deﬁnitions are summarized in Appendix A. The
canton of Jura is excluded from our sample since this canton was created in the late
seventies and women were granted the right to vote at that time.
The right to vote and eligibility at the cantonal level was introduced across cantons
11at diﬀerent times between 1959 and 1990, implying substantial cross-sectional and time
variation. Figure 1 illustrates the number of cantons that introduced women’s suﬀrage for
each year. The cantons of Vaud and Neuchˆ atel ﬁrst introduced the right to vote for women
in 1959, soon followed by the canton of Geneva in 1960. A few other cantons granted the
right to vote during the sixties. A federal referendum in 1971, which led to the franchise
at the federal level, induced many cantons to introduce the right to vote and eligibility
for women in the early seventies. Appenzell A. Rh. only granted the right to vote at the
cantonal level in 1989, followed by Appenzell I. Rh. which was forced to do so following a
decision by the Federal Court of Justice.
Are the dates of women’s enfranchisement truly exogenous to the economy? The his-
tory of the adoption of women’s vote in Swiss cantons suggests that the answer is yes. The
introduction of women’s franchise at such a late stage compared to the rest of Europe was
largely determined by political forces. Any modiﬁcation of the federal constitution requires
the approval of a majority of voters as well as a majority of cantons which delayed the
adoption of female suﬀrage on the federal level. The Swiss membership of the Council of
Europe in 1963 precipitated the enfranchisement, as a ratiﬁcation of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights required universal (including female) suﬀrage. To accommodate
this, the Swiss Federal Council prepared a revision to the Constitution which was ﬁnally
accepted in February 1971. The intercantonal variation in the introduction of women’s
vote also does not seem dependent on economic conditions per se. Funk and Gathmann
(2006) show that cantonal support for the franchise was driven by time-invariant cultural
characteristics (captured mainly by language) and the level of education in addition to the
12Figure 1: Introduction of the right to vote for women
federal adoption of women’s vote.
Figure 2 illustrates the large cross-section heterogeneity in average cantonal budget bal-
ances. Only one canton, Appenzell I. Rh., had an average budget balance in surplus across
the time span considered, while all other cantons exhibited average deﬁcits. Figure 3 shows
the average and median real budget balances per capita for each year from 1954 to 1999,
exhibiting substantial time variation. The cantonal average budget was predominantly in
deﬁcit during our sample period, with the exception of the second half of the eighties. A
closer inspection of the data reveals two outliers8. Appenzell A. Rh. had an extraordinary
budget surplus in 1996 after the canton sold its cantonal bank. Moreover, Geneva had
abnormally large budget deﬁcits during the early nineties. We control for these outliers
8Figure A1 in Appendix A shows real budget balances for each canton over time.
13Figure 2: Swiss cantons’ average budget balances per capita between 1954 and 1999. In
constant 1993 Swiss francs
Figure 3: Cantonal average and median budget balances per capita, 1954-1999. In constant
1993 Swiss francs
14using canton-speciﬁc time dummies.
5 Results
Table 1 presents the results from the estimation of equation (1). The null hypothesis that
all coeﬃcients are jointly equal to zero, and the null hypothesis that the ﬁxed eﬀects are
equal are rejected for all speciﬁcations. Most time eﬀects have signiﬁcant impacts on the
budget, picking up unobserved heterogeneity in federal and international variables. The
time eﬀects are particularly large and signiﬁcant in the seventies and the nineties, two
periods characterized by a generalized economic slowdown.
5.1 The impact of the franchise on budget deﬁcits
In the baseline speciﬁcation (I) including the dummy for female suﬀrage, canton and time
ﬁxed eﬀects and dummy variables for outliers, the parameter estimate for the vote dummy
of -117 is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level, supporting the hypothesis that granting
the right to vote to women reduces budget deﬁcits. Speciﬁcation (II) shows that the size
and signiﬁcance of the vote dummy are robust to the inclusion of the rate of growth of
real gross cantonal income, the rate of growth of federal unconditional grants to cantons9
and a dummy variable for the presence of ﬁscal rules. The coeﬃcient estimate for the rate
of growth of real gross cantonal income turns out to be negative, as expected, but it is
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Barro tax smoothing types of determinants of the
9Whether federal unconditional grants should be entered in growth rates, ﬁrst diﬀerences or in levels
(all of which are used in the literature) is unclear, so we have tried all three forms. The result is the same
regarding the robustness of the vote dummy, which remains positive, of similar size and statistically signif-
icant on the 5 percent level in all three cases. We have used growth rates of transfers in our speciﬁcation
as these are stationary.
15budget deﬁcit could potentially still be present, however, as most of cantonal economic
activity depends on federal and international factors which are captured by the time ﬁxed
eﬀects. Increasing federal transfers are associated with lower budget deﬁcits and this eﬀect
is statistically signiﬁcant. Finally, the presence of ﬁscal rules improves budget outcomes
but this eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant. Speciﬁcation (III) adds the ideology of the
cantonal parliament to the regression10. The estimated sign is in line with the prior that
a more leftist parliament is associated with a higher budget deﬁcit11, but the coeﬃcient is
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Adding ideology does not result in any major change
in the size or signiﬁcance level of the vote dummy. Finally, speciﬁcation (IV) which adds
current and lagged election years, shows that there is no support for election cycles at the
cantonal level in Switzerland. The vote dummy, meanwhile, retains its signiﬁcance and
size.
The number of observations decreases substantially when ideology is introduced (spec-
iﬁcations (III) and (IV)), because the ideology of cantonal parliaments is missing for the
cantons of Appenzell A. Rh. and Appenzell I. Rh., as well as for some years for Obwald
and Nidwald. This decrease in sample size is the main reason for the moderate drop in the
value of the parameter estimate of the vote dummy when ideology is introduced (rather
than due to the introduction of ideology itself)12. Finally, we also check whether the size
10Ideology of parliament could be expected to be caused by the franchise, thus leading to endogeneity
problems when it is included. This is, however, not a problem here, since including ideology into a
regression which already is restricted to include only the observations for which ideology is available does
not change the parameter estimate for the vote dummy.
11Although the sign of the parameter estimate is opposite to the theoretical prediction of Persson and
Svensson (1989), who ﬁnd that right wing parties would run deﬁcits in order to increase the level of debt
and thereby reduce the possibilities for spending of future left wing governments.
12Estimating speciﬁcation (I) without the four cantons with missing observations yields a coeﬃcient
16Table 1: Determinants of real budget deﬁcits per capitaa,b
Regressors (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Vote −117.50 −116.77 −96.46 −99.39 −95.12
(3.23∗∗∗) (3.21∗∗∗) (2.20∗∗) (2.26∗∗) (2.16∗∗)
Economic growth −2.17 0.40 0.65 1.03
(0.37) (0.06) (0.10) (0.17)
Federal transfers −91.91 −93.65 −96.05 −99.29
(2.17∗∗) (2.10∗∗) (2.10∗∗) (2.18∗∗)
Fiscal rule −38.59 −40.67 −36.32 −49.62
(0.95) (0.86) (0.76) (1.06)
Ideology 1.39 1.48 1.82
(0.54) (0.57) (0.71)
Election year 5.70 6.25
(0.25) (0.27)
Pre-election year −5.26 −4.35
(0.25) (0.21)
Income per capita −0.005
(1.54)
Dummy Appenzell A.Rh. 1996 −2821.04 −2807.14 - - -
(39.81∗∗∗) (36.99∗∗∗) - - -
Dummy Geneva 1991 1281.21 1271.81 1266.95 1269.11 1285.18
(14.48∗∗∗) (14.32∗∗∗) (13.62∗∗∗) (13.57∗∗∗) (13.81∗∗∗)
Dummy Geneva 1992 1020.71 998.99 997.98 1006.28 1011.47
(9.73∗∗∗) (9.22∗∗∗) (8.69∗∗∗) (8.60∗∗∗) (8.77∗∗∗)
Dummy Geneva 1993 1990.34 1978.20 1948.39 1944.05 1942.71
(18.86∗∗∗) (18.75∗∗∗) (17.34∗∗∗) (17.08∗∗∗) (16.86∗∗∗)
Dummy Geneva 1994 1172.66 1162.18 1133.02 1136.48 1124.93
(12.88∗∗∗) (12.51∗∗∗) (11.89∗∗∗) (11.91∗∗∗) (11.69∗∗∗)
Observations 1125 1125 1024 1009 1009
Cantons 25 25 23 23 23
Canton-speciﬁc eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 statistic 0.3667 0.3742 0.3854 0.3863 0.3697
a Robust standard errors are used. Absolute values of t statistics in parentheses. ∗ Signiﬁcant at 10%;
∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5% level; ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1% level.
b The dependent variable is real budget deﬁcits per capita (measured in 1993 Swiss francs).
17and signiﬁcance of the parameter estimate for the vote dummy is driven by a single can-
ton. Dropping one canton at a time, the coeﬃcient for the vote dummy variable remains
positive, not substantially diﬀerent in size, and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level13.
As a small aside on the ﬁndings of estimating speciﬁcations (II) to (IV), the lack
of signiﬁcance of the larger part of the control variables is at odds with the ﬁndings of
the empirical literature in general (see Imbeau, 2004, for a review of the ﬁndings of this
literature). One reason for this could be that we include both time and ﬁxed eﬀects. Taking
out time eﬀects or cross section ﬁxed eﬀects, or both, leads to dramatically diﬀerent results
and a high level of signiﬁcance of some of the additional control variables14.
To sum up, the parameter estimate for female suﬀrage is negative and statistically sig-
niﬁcant across all speciﬁcations. Regressions (I) to (IV) suggest that the impact lies some-
where between -97 and -117 Swiss francs per capita (measured in constant 1993 prices).
Beyond statistical signiﬁcance, is such a coeﬃcient estimate economically relevant? Com-
pared to the cantonal average real budget deﬁcit of 123.98 Swiss francs per capita for the
time period under study, the answer is a cautious yes. For example, a back-of-the-envelope
calculation for 1999 suggests that a change in the budget deﬁcit of between -97 and -117
Swiss francs (measured in 1993 prices) leads to a change of between 1.25 to 1.50 percent-
estimate for the vote dummy variable equal to -98.3, not much diﬀerent from the parameter estimate
obtained in speciﬁcations (III) and (IV). Note that excluding the two cantons of Appenzell from the
sample is not desirable since these cantons granted the right to vote to women relatively late, in 1989 and
1990 respectively, thereby introducing important time variation in the vote dummy.
13We conducted this sequential exclusion of cantons using both the basic speciﬁcation, and the speciﬁca-
tion including transfers per capita (all three forms of transfers, see footnote (9)). The results in both cases
implied that the parameter estimate is robust. The only thing to note from this exercise is that the pa-
rameter estimate drops to about 73 when Geneva is excluded, implying some - expectedly - cross-cantonal
heterogeneity. The results are not shown but can be obtained from the authors upon request.
14It is desirable to include ﬁxed eﬀects in such regressions to control for cross cantonal diﬀerences in
ﬁscal preferences, however. Krogstrup and W¨ alti (2007) explores this issue further for ﬁscal rules.
18age points in the ratio of cantonal spending which is deﬁcit ﬁnanced. Since the cantonal
average budget was in surplus by an amount corresponding to half a percent of average
cantonal spending in 1999, our estimates suggest that if women had not had the right to
vote in 1999, the average cantonal budget would instead have been in deﬁcit of about 0.75
and 1 percent of average cantonal spending. Compounded over decades, this could have a
considerable eﬀects on accumulated cantonal debt levels.
The literature estimating the impact of female suﬀrage on the size of the state using
Swiss cantonal data consistently ﬁnds that the introduction of female voters signiﬁcantly
reduces cantonal spending. Hence, at least part of the reduction in deﬁcits due to the
franchise in Swiss cantons is likely to derive from expenditure reductions. To examine
whether this is the whole story behind the suﬀrage eﬀect on deﬁcits, we regress real cantonal
spending per capita and real cantonal tax revenues per capita on the vote dummy and
control variables. The outcome of these regressions is presented in Table 2.
Table 2 shows that the introduction of the right to vote for women is associated with
lower spending as well as lower taxes15, suggesting that on the average, Swiss women
voters are more conservative regarding both the size of the state and deﬁcit ﬁnancing of
expenditures than Swiss men16.
15The estimated negative impact on taxes is contrary to the ﬁndings by Funk and Gathmann (2006),
which is curious given the rather similar estimation procedures used.
16While this is not the focus of the present exercise, the estimated impacts of ideology and ﬁscal rules
in Table 2 are also worth noting. Much in line with expectation, both spending and taxes are higher when
left-wing parties hold more seats in cantonal parliaments, while ideology was found to have no implication
for the budget balance in the deﬁcit regressions given in Table 1. Finally, the presence of ﬁscal rules does
not only lead to lower spending, but also to lower tax revenues. Hence, our results indicate that both
parliament ideology and ﬁscal rules aﬀect the size of the state rather than one particular side of the public
balance sheet.
19Table 2: Spending and tax regressionsa,b
Regressors (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX)
Vote −612.74 −981.53 −453.16 −850.97
(3.89∗∗∗) (4.79∗∗∗) (3.08∗∗∗) (4.58∗∗∗)
Economic growth 31.92 42.77 37.35 45.92
(1.39) (1.84∗) (1.63) (2.00∗∗)
Federal transfers −36.64 −19.50 49.24 85.61
(0.21) (0.10) (0.29) (0.45)
Fiscal rule −392.95 −752.49 −257.42 −696.38
(3.24∗∗∗) (5.04∗∗∗) (1.64) (5.16∗∗∗)
Ideology 68.21 65.32
(7.23∗∗∗) (7.49∗∗∗)
Election year −22.79 −31.05
(0.27) (0.39)
Pre-election year 11.60 17.13
(0.13) (0.21)
Observations 1125 1009 1125 1009
Cantons 25 23 25 23
Canton-speciﬁc eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 statistic 0.4741 0.4931 0.4881 0.4976
a Robust standard errors are used. Absolute values of t statistics in paren-
theses. ∗ Signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5% level; ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at
1% level.
b Speciﬁcations (VI) and (VII) focus on real spending per capita, while Spec-
iﬁcations (VIII) and (IX) deal with real tax revenues per capita.
205.2 Omitted variables
We can think of four omitted variables which could potentially be correlated with the
introduction of the franchise and could potentially aﬀect cantonal deﬁcits. First, Swiss
women have generally been less educated than Swiss men during the sample period17.
Therefore, as women become part of the electorate, the average level of education of the
electorate falls. Would less educated individuals prefer lower deﬁcits? The literature has
established a link from education to time discounting which suggests that the opposite
is more likely to be the case (less education implies a greater discounting of time - see
for example Harrison, Lau and Williams, 2002). However, this eﬀect is likely to be a
within-gender eﬀect with the causality going from time discounting to choice of education,
and if this is the only link, it should be picked up by the vote dummy and not be an
omitted variable. Alternatively, if more educated individuals are more likely to be aware of
the intertemporal budget constraint, they should prefer lower deﬁcits18. But such a story
implies that women should prefer higher budget deﬁcits, counter to what we ﬁnd. The
level of education as an omitted variable is hence unlikely to be driving our results. At
most, it could be suspected to downward bias the estimated eﬀect of enfranchisement on
deﬁcits.
A second potential omitted variable is the income level of the electorate. There is
clearly a potential link from level of income to preferences for the composition and level of
public goods provision, but it is less clear that there should be a link from income levels to
17Stutzer and Kienast (2005).
18This argument could be based on a ﬁscal illusion type of reasoning a la Buchanan (1964).
21preferences for deﬁcit ﬁnancing these public goods. One story could be that lower income
individuals are likely to be more credit constrained than higher-income individuals, and
might hence want the cantonal government to do more borrowing on their behalf. But
this would imply that women should prefer higher, not lower, deﬁcits. Hence, we again
conclude that the average income level of voters is unlikely to be driving our results.
Third, the timing of women’s suﬀrage and the timing of women’s choice to enter the
labor force could be correlated. If this is the case, then women’s taxable income from work
outside the household might increase income tax revenues of the canton at the time women
get the right to vote. It is unfortunately not possible to directly test this hypothesis, as
there is no yearly data on either labor market participation or employment by gender and
canton19. We instead test this hypothesis indirectly by including real income per capita
in the regressions (see Table 1, speciﬁcation (V)). Measured income per capita should
increase as women’s income from work outside the household becomes included in the
national accounts. Since real income per capita is not signiﬁcant and does not change the
parameter estimate for the vote dummy, we consider that female labor market participation
is unlikely to be driving the results20.
Fourth, women were granted the right to vote in a referendum in which only men would
vote. It is hence possible that the date of female enfranchisement captures a change in
the underlying preferences of male voters, which in turn also aﬀects men’s preferences
19Data on labor market participation and employment by canton and gender only exists in ten year
intervals starting from 1980, from the Swiss decennial population census. Funk and Gathmann (2006)
interpolate the remaining yearly data points, and use this data in cantonal panel regressions. Using
interpolated data series would not make much sense here, as exact yearly changes around the time of
enfranchisement would be needed to test the hypothesis.
20We also tried including ﬁrst diﬀerences of income per capita, with no change in the conclusions.
22for deﬁcits. If male preferences are such that liberal attitudes toward deﬁcits also implies
liberal attitudes toward female suﬀrage, the parameter estimate of female suﬀrage in deﬁcit
regressions would be downward biased, and hence would not drive the results. If, less
intuitively, male support for female suﬀrage were decreasing in male support for deﬁcits,
then a negative correlation between female suﬀrage and deﬁcits could be capturing the
omitted variable of underlying time varying trends in male preferences rather than a causal
relationship from female suﬀrage to deﬁcits. Note that if there is no time-varying cantonal
heterogeneity in male preferences for deﬁcits and female suﬀrage, then the eﬀect of such
preferences would be captured in the time and canton ﬁxed eﬀects. We are hence only
concerned with time-varying cantonal heterogeneity in male preferences pertaining to ﬁscal
outcomes and female suﬀrage. Using data on male support for government expenditures
as a measure of male ﬁscal preferences, Funk and Gathmann (2006) show that there is
no time-varying cantonal heterogeneity in the ﬁscal preferences of men in their data. In
additional regressions, they show that cantonal support for the franchise was not driven
by ﬁscal variables.
6 Conclusion
If women have diﬀerent preferences than men - be these of biological, social or cultural
origin - then the political inﬂuence of women has the potential to aﬀect macroeconomic
outcomes through qualitative changes in policy or household decisions. Important economic
eﬀects of empowering women have been documented at the micro level. At the macro level,
however, the literature on the eﬀect of gender gaps in preferences has been narrowly focused
23on the impact of political gender gaps on the provision of public goods and the size of the
state. This paper adds to the literature on the eﬀect of women’s political and economic
inﬂuence on macroeconomic outcomes by estimating the impact of female empowerment
on government budget deﬁcits, and hence, ultimately on public debt levels.
A panel regression analysis of the impact of the franchise on budget deﬁcits in Swiss
cantons shows that Swiss women indeed prefer lower budget deﬁcits than men. The eﬀect
is small, but signiﬁcant and very robust, implying that female enfranchisement may have
mitigated the debt built-ups of the last decades. On a more general note, the ﬁndings
suggest that vesting economic and political power with women is likely to change macroe-
conomic outcomes, not just because female empowerment doubles the available amount of
talent or labor in the economy, but because women’s preferences, and therefore decisions,
are diﬀerent from men’s.
While our research design and macroeconomic data does not allow us to identify the
exact underlying gender gap in preferences causing the results, the analysis does suggest
that we are likely to be capturing diﬀerences in life expectancy, altruism, prudence and/or
patience, rather than gender diﬀerences in economic constraints, such as income, educa-
tion levels or labor market participation. The limited geographical scope of the analysis
unfortunately does not allow us to deal with the question of nature versus nurture as the
ultimate cause of these gender diﬀerences. If the ﬁnding is due to an underlying biological
gender diﬀerence, then the eﬀect of suﬀrage on budget deﬁcits should be qualitatively the
same across diverse cultures21. To address the question of nature versus nurture, the study
21This point is made very clear by Gneezy et al, 2006, in the context of the experimental literature on
24could hence be extended by estimating the impact of female suﬀrage on budget balances
for a set of more culturally diverse countries. We leave this for future research.
gender diﬀerences in the willingness to seek and accept competitive situations.
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31Table A1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Budget balance per capita (1993 Swiss francs) -121.111 348.417 -2806.204 2603.944
Vote dummy 0.634 0.482 0 1
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Growth of real transfers per capita 0.059 0.246 -0.668 1.647
Fiscal rule dummy 0.102 0.302 0 1
Political ideology 0.238 0.136 0 0.577
Election year dummy 0.258 0.438 0 1
Pre-election year dummy 0.260 0.438 0 1
























































33B A median voter model with credit constraints and
gender speciﬁc time preferences
When citizens are fully or partially credit constrained, the government budget deﬁcit can
be viewed as an indirect means of borrowing on behalf of the citizens. This means that
citizens will want to run deﬁcits for the same reasons that a credit-unconstrained citizen
would want to borrow to smooth their consumption over time. In turn, these motives
depend on individual preferences. We incorporate this view of the government budget
deﬁcit in a simple median voter model below. To have an eﬀect on economic outcomes of
extending the right to vote to women, we have to move away from the standard assumption
of a unitary household as the unit of optimization, and assume that men and women
optimize their respective utility under their respective constraints separately. Allowing
preferences and hence utility to diﬀer systematically across men and women then leads to
gender speciﬁc diﬀerences in the preferred level of the government budget deﬁcit, and in
turn, to a diﬀerent realized budget deﬁcit as women are extended the right to vote.
The basic structure of the model is a two period model of the government budget,
in which the ﬁrst period budget balance is determined by the median voter through an
election. The total population consists of n citizens, of which half is male and half is female.
All citizens have the same ﬁxed per period income which, without loss of generality, can be
normalized to zero22. Moreover, each citizen receives an equal amount of net government
22Allowing income to diﬀer across men and women would complicate the derivations, but would not
change the basic conclusions which are only driven by the diﬀerences in preferences assumed below. Even
if we allow for the combination of progressive income taxation and a lower average income level of women,
this would only aﬀect the demand for public goods, but not the desired intertemporal ﬁnancing proﬁle,
and hence, not the deﬁcit. As we abstract from levels of spending and taxes here, we do not pursue this
issue further.
34transfers in each of the two periods, gt,t = 1,2, where the net transfer is deﬁned as
transfers received from government less taxes paid23. The assumption that all citizens
receive the same transfer clearly does not reﬂect reality very well, but is a simpliﬁcation
which underscores our results, and also allows us to abstract from deﬁcits arising due to
common pool problems24.
Assume for simplicity that citizens are fully credit constrained (a partial credit con-
straint would do, but a full credit constraint simpliﬁes the model signiﬁcantly). The citizens
derive utility from total consumption, which under the credit constraint and the normal-
ization of private income to zero becomes equal to the net transfer. Thus, citizen i’s utility
is given by the utility function:
U
i = ui (g1) + βiui (g2), (2)
where ui is the felicity utility function and βi = 1
1+ρi is the time discount factor for
citizen i. Assume further that:
u
0
i (·) > 0, u
00
i (·) < 0, and lim
g→−∞u
0
i (·) = ∞ for all i. (3)
To keep to the basic assumptions of the median voter model, assume that citizens
diﬀer along one dimension only. In terms of the model, this dimension could for example be
citizens’ time preference, βi, or the degree to which citizens are prudent and want to save for
23This way of expressing net transfers was ﬁrst proposed by Velasco (1999). Transfers from government
can be seen as including both social transfers and public goods, as public and private goods are assumed
to be perfect substitutes.
24See Krogstrup and Wyplosz (2006) for a similar basic setup in which transfers can diﬀer across groups,
leading to common pool problems and a deﬁcit bias.
35precautionary reasons, u000
i . We make the example of gender diﬀerences in time preference
here. Assume that the time discount factor derives from one of two distributions, namely
that of men and that of women. The βi,h is the subjective discount factor of individual i








where e βw and e βm are the relative weights given to the future by the individual who
cares most about the future within each of the two groups. Assume that on average women
care more about the future than men:
e βw > e βm (5)
Assumption (4) on the distribution of the subjective time discount factors may seem
ad hoc, but the particular shape of the distribution is of no consequence for the results,
as long as the median woman cares more about the future than the median man25. The
government’s only role in this model is to set net transfers to its citizens by implementing
the budget deﬁcit policy announced prior to election (more on the election below). In
doing so, it is allowed to borrow or lend at the relevant interest rate as a means of ﬁnancing
potential deﬁcits/surpluses. The government is assumed to fully respect the intertemporal
budget constraint, and there is therefore no issue of debt default in the model. Let b denote
the government budget deﬁcit in period one, such that b = ng1. The intertemporal budget
25Browning (2000) makes a similar core assumption on gender speciﬁc preferences in a model of intra-
household savings decisions.
36constraint thus becomes:
ng1 + Rng2 = 0 (6)
where R = 1
1+r. We assume that the economy is small and open, and hence, that the
interest rate is ﬁxed at the world level. Maximizing (2) with respect to ﬁrst and second
period net transfers, subject to the intertemporal budget constraint (6), yields the two ﬁrst




















where asterisks denote preferred policies, and g∗
1 hence denotes the preferred net transfer
in period one of citizen i. Note that (7) implies that the optimal transfer depends negatively
on the relative weight that the citizen places on future consumption, βi.
We now turn to the elections. Let two parties, which each derive utility solely from
being in oﬃce, compete for government at the beginning of period one. The party which
wins takes oﬃce immediately, at the beginning of period one, and stays in oﬃce till the end
of period two. The two parties campaign by announcing a ﬁscal policy to be implemented
if they win the election. Since their only objective is to be elected for oﬃce, they will both
announce the policy which maximizes their respective number of votes. Citizen i will vote
for the party with the announced deﬁcit policy that attains her highest utility level. As is
37standard in median voter models, both parties end up announcing the preferred policy of
the median voter, which hence will be the winning policy26. All we have to do to know the
implemented ﬁscal policy is therefore to derive the preferred policy of the median voter.
The identity of the median voter depends on who has the right to vote. Assume ﬁrst







where bars denote values for the median voter. Following from (4) and (7), the median
man’s preferred budget deﬁcit, b
∗






















Now extend the right to vote to women. Adding the distributions of the two groups








nk for k 5 n
θ2
2e βw







e βw+e βm > 1
2. The time preference parameter of the median voter of the total
population (i.e. the n
2th citizen), now becomes
26For the standard median voter argument, see Hotelling’s (1929) spatial voting model, and Metzler and
Richards (1981) for an application to explaining the size of government.
38βp = θe βm (10)
where the p subscript denotes values for the median voter of the entire population. The
associated preferred budget deﬁcit policy of the median voter when women are included in




















Since θ > 1






The median voter has a lower preferred budget deﬁcit when women are included in the
electorate under assumption (5).
39